arguing for the stakeholder status of animals in research corporations gives advocates (both academic and traditional) a new tool to use in the fight for the proper consideration of animal interests. It brings the conversation-in an or ganic and relevant way-to a group of people who would have likely remained uninformed of the issue, and offers defenders of animal interests the oppor tunity to employ a general method of advocacy that has historically been very successful. The argument in this chapter proceeds as follows. To begin, I discuss the broad and narrow interpretations of the stakeholder view, and I argue that the narrow view offers a more practical framework for making business decisions. Following this, I will show that, while no iteration of stakeholder theory ever directly identifies animals as stakeholders, the inclusion of research animals in this category is as self-evident as the inclusion of employees; minimally, this demands that the moral manager properly considers the interests that re search animals have in not suffering. I then contend that if research animals really are stakeholders, and if their interests really are more urgent than the interests of other stakeholders, then the presumed legitimacy of animal ex perimentation needs to be reevaluated. Finally, in the last section I offer some responses to three potential objections to the arguments put forth in this chap ter. Ultimately, I conclude that, from the point of view of stakeholder theory, animal experimentation, especially when it inflicts suffering on animal sub jects, is not justifiable.

2
Narrow and Broad Interpretations of the Stakeholder View
Stakeholder theorists claim that the purpose of the corporation is to harmonize the interests of the stakeholders, though there is not widespread agreement on how to identify stakeholders
. Indeed, Mitchell et al. (1997) 
have catalogued 27 different conceptions of the stakeholder, including some of the following:
A stakeholder is/stakeholders are: -a person or group, "which the organization is dependent on for its contin ued survival" (Freeman and Reid, 1983, p. 91; Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 85 8) -a person or group, "that benefit[ s] from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions." (Evan and Freeman, 1988 , p. 79 ; Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 858 ) -"constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm [ ... ] established through the existence of an exchange relationship" and who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied" (Hill and Jones, 1992, p. 133; Mitchell et al. 1997, p. 858 (Brenner, 1993, p. 205 ; Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 858 ) -"the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm" (Langtry, 1994 , p. 433; Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 85 8) -and "persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or sub stantive aspects of corporate activity." (Donaldson and Preston, 1995 , p. 85 ; Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 858) . The most frequently cited stakeholder theorist, Edward Freeman (1984 ) Freeman and Reed, 1983) . As Orts and Strudler (2002, p. 218) One such definition proposes that stakeholders be identified as those groups, "who are vital to the survival and success of the firm" (Evan and Free man 1998 , p. 58) , or who are "definitional to the firm" (Freeman et al., 2002, p. 31 Orts and Strudler (2002, p. 221) Mitchell et al., 1996, and references therein) (Regan, 1983, p. 88 (Singer, 2008, p. 37 Hartung, 2019; Noor, 2019; Taylor, 2019; Wilkinson, 2019 (1966, last amended 2013 (Singer, 2002, Chapter 2) . Second, the Act does not cover mice, rats, birds, or reptiles; so, these animals-the ani mals who comprise the majority of laboratory animals-are not guaranteed any protections (us Animal Welfare Act, 1966 , last amended 2013 is, in most cases, wrong ( e.g., DeGrazia, 1996; Regan, 1983; Singer, 2002 
